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ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Plaintiff, Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan, on November 18, 2003, filed her Affidavit

in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and stated as follows: "That
although I had been told by my mother there was a Trust, I never had any actual knowledge that a
Trust existed until I was contacted by Robert Welling of Beehive Detective Agency Inc." (R.
327).
2.

In response to Defendants' Statement of Fact, paragraph 15, Plaintiffs allege that

George Fadel, Defendants' attorney, in his answer and interrogatories admitted that he had
prepared the Trusts but that he had forgotten about the irrevocable Trusts when he talked to both
Plaintiffs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendants claim, "when a trustee denies the trust and assumes ownership of the trust
property with the knowledge of the beneficiaries, the statute of limitation begin to run.". This
argument is without merit in that the settlor, Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, had created an irrevocable
Trust and specifically provided that he had no interest in the property and the Trust could not be
repudiated without the consent of the beneficiaries. See Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1990 (Utah
2002).
Further, Defendants argue "that on July 7, 1997, Plaintiffs had all of the information
necessary to know there had been a breach of the Trusts which were to convey the property to
them." This argument is likewise without merit in that George Fadel, Defendants' attorney,
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had specifically advised both Plaintiffs that there were no Trusts and they were to receive no
property from their grandfather.
Finally, Defendants argue "that Plaintiffs failed to take action to protect their interest and
their claim to the property was extinguished". However, Defendants fail to mention that due to
the acts of Defendants' attorney, Plaintiffs were made to believe that there was no Trust, and
Plaintiffs, when discovering the Trusts in August, 2002, took immediate action by filing a Petition
to Appoint Successor Trustee and commencing this action to take possession of the Trust
property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN QUIET TITLE ACTIONS.
Defendants in their response argue that the underlying action is barred by a four-year
statute of limitations, although never disavowing that the Irrevocable Trust is not the fee owner of
the two pieces of real property and that Plaintiffs are the beneficiaries of the Trust. Consequently,
Plaintiff, Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan, as beneficiary of the trust, rightfully petitioned under
Probate No. 023901215 TR to be appointed as Successor Trustee, and to quiet title to the Trust
property. The Court of Appeals in Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 841 P.2d 742 (Utah 1942)
stated:
Statute empowering Trustee to sue on behalf of beneficiary does
not preclude beneficiary from suing in capacity as beneficiary.
U.C.A. 1953, 75-7-402(3)(2).
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In that case, the Trustee had failed to commence an action against Dean Witter for over 10 years
and the Court ruled that the beneficiary had standing to bring an action.
Just as in that case, Plaintiffs here can show that the Irrevocable Trust is the fee owner of
the property and that Plaintiffs are the beneficiaries of the Trust and are entitled to have
ownership and possession of the real property.
Defendants further claim, "The Trial Court took no steps to determine the ownership of
the property which is vested in Defendants, pursuant to the Deeds of Distribution of Malu's
Estate."
This argument is wholly without merit since the property is vested in the Irrevocable
Trusts and the Deeds of Distribution conveyed nothing in that the Estate of Malualani Hoopiiaina
had no interest in the property in that it had been irrevocably conveyed to the Trust in 1974.
In granting summary judgment, the Court simply determined it was not interested in who
owned the property and did not attempt to determine the validity of the clouds on the title.
Defendants state in their argument that, "The Summary Judgment ruling defines the
property that is owned by the Trusts and what the Trustee will have to administer. There is no
reason why a successor Trustee cannot be appointed."
This again is without merit in that the Court has erroneously ruled that the Statute of
Limitations has run on the beneficiaries' rights to receive the property from the Trust.
The Court consolidated the probate case which was Plaintiffs' Petition to be appointed
Successor Trustee with the civil case and based on the fact this appointment was to be ruled upon
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at trial, Defendants would be required to defend Plaintiffs' right to be the Successor Trustee.
Defendants have not filed a defense to the Petition to Appoint Plaintiff Successor Trustee.
POINT II
THERE IS NO APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
ON IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS.
Defendants also argue that the cases cited by Defendants all involve revocable trusts and
have no application in the case before this Court. It is undisputed that the Trusts which are the
subject of these proceedings are irrevocable Trusts where the Settlor specifically provided, "at no
time shall any beneficial interest in the Trust property inure to the Settlor".
The law is very clear that an irrevocable Trust cannot be repudicated without the consent
of the beneficiaries.
In Banks v. Means, 52 P.3rd 1990 (Utah 2002), the Court ruled as follows:
"Once the settlor has created a trust he is no longer the owner of
the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is
expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument".
"A settlor has the power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to
the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the
trust".
"The creation of a trust involves the transfer of property interest in
the trust subject-matter of the beneficiaries, and these interests
cannot be taken from the beneficiaries except in accordance with a
provision of the trust instrument."
The Defendants further argue:
"Malu's will breached his obligation as Trustee for Trusts by
ownership of the property. Plaintiffs knew of the breach of Malu's
obligation to them when they received copies of the will and
4

realized that the property was bequeathed to Defendants. Upon
this realization, the requirement for the imposition of the statute of
limitation began to run."
This argument is again without merit based upon the following: (a) Malu as Trustee could
not assume ownership of property in that he had irrevocably conveyed the property (Banks v.
Means, 52 P.3d 1990 (Utah 2002)); (b) Trusts have no statute of limitations; (c) the beneficiary,
Michael Gatlin, never saw a will; and (d) neither Plaintiffs had knowledge as to where the Trusts
were located or what property was in the Trusts.
Plaintiffs' action was brought to determine the Trusts were the owner of certain real
property and Plaintiffs' purpose was not to obtain affirmative relief, rather was brought to quiet
title to the Trust property. The property was being occupied by a lessee of Defendants, and
Defendants had placed a cloud on the Title by filing Deeds of Distribution and Lis Pendens against
the Trust property. Plaintiffs requested the Court to determine that the clouds on the title were
void and to determine that Plaintiffs, as the surviving beneficiaries of the Trust, were the fee
owners of the property. All of the actions requested by Plaintiffs involved only requests to the
Court to quiet title to the property in Plaintiffs and to remove all clouds on that title.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) is not applicable in that the Court in its ruling stated that it
did not think it was applicable, but then signed a judgment that it was applicable (Court
Transcript. P. 2, L. 9-14). The Defendants have cited the case of Snow v. Rudd. 998 P.2d 262
(Utah 2000), which was an action to impose a constructive Trust that was held in mother's Trust
and sold by father, as Trustee, to beneficiary's sister. This was a Revocable Trust. This was an
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action against Successor Trustee where Plaintiff had knowledge of the sale of the home which
initially was in Trust. In the case before the Court, no Successor Trustee has been appointed.
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1006 is not applicable for several reasons:
a. A trust has no Statute of Limitations until 6 months after property has been
distributed to beneficiaries (Utah Code Ann. §75-7-307).
b. The property before the Court was not estate property. Malualani Hoopiiaina
had divested himself of any ownership or right to property when he signed and recorded the
Irrevocable Trusts in 1974.
c. The Deeds of Distribution by Personal Representative conveyed nothing as the
Estate had no interest in the property and, therefore, the Deeds were only a cloud on the title.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-19 was not used by the Court in its summary judgment order,
rather only §78-12-25 and §75-3-1006.
Even assuming the Court had used §78-12-19, it is not applicable in that it provides for
property "sold" or in other words a third party is involved and is the one protected. In this case
Defendant Cuma Hoopiiaina as personal representative conveyed to herself and her son wherein
the estate had no interest in the property.
Defendants also argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-19, "When the personal
representative of Malu's estate conveyed the property to Defendants, the conveyance constituted
a 'sale' under the terms of the statute." However, the Court below never addressed the
applicability of §78-12-19, and the intent of that section was to protect innocent buyers of
property from estates, not personal representatives.
6

Also, the conveyance by the personal representative of the trust property to herself had no
legal affect in that the estate had no interest or title to the trust properties.
POINT III
THE DISCOVERY RULE HAS APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
Defendants argue that the discovery rule does not apply in this case for the reason that
there is no concealment or no exceptional circumstances to justify the discovery rule. Defendants'
argument is without merit in that the Court in its opinion specifically provided as follows: "It's
also my tentative view that the discovery rule would be applicable and the discovery rule is
primarily or most often, a decision of fact". (Court Transcript, P. 4, L. 19-22).
Plaintiffs were advised by George Fadel, who had prepared the trust for Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina and who was the attorney for Defendants, that no trust existed and that they had no
right, title and interest in the real property of Malualani B. Hoopiiaina.
Defendants further argue: "The dismissal of George Fadel as a Defendant must be
considered by the Court to be a waiver of the claim of concealment as to George Fadel."
This again is not true in that the Complaint against George Fadel was based on fraud, and
pursuant to discovery, Plaintiffs determined that George Fadel had not fraudulently withheld the
information about the Trusts, but that he had forgotten he had prepared the Trusts until they were
discovered by Plaintiffs' attorney. George Fadel had the obligation to determine if Trusts existed
when questions were raised by Plaintiffs in that he was the attorney for Defendants and the Estate
of Malualani Hoopiiaina, and had prepared the Trusts, which was concealment by Defendants by
and through their attorney.
7

There was concealment by Defendants. The Defendants and their attorney were well
aware that the property was in the name of the trust by reason of Court of Appeals ruling in Civil
No. 920906000, Court of Appeals No. 93078-CA of January 31, 1995 (R-151-160). This
information was likewise concealed by Defendants and their attorney, George Fadel.
Plaintiffs had been told there were Trusts by their mother, but had no knowledge as to the
location of the Trusts, or whether the Trusts contained real or personal property.
Plaintiff, Michael Gatlin, was never in the State of Utah, was homeless, and had no
knowledge of anything except his conversation with George Fadel, Defendants' attorney, who
advised him that there were no Trusts, his grandfather had disinherited him, and he was to receive
nothing.
Plaintiff, Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan, had no actual knowledge of any Trusts, only
statements by her mother when she was young that a Trust existed; however, based on Ms. Nolan
believing George Fadel, she determined that no Trusts existed and that she had been disinherited
by her grandfather.
The Discovery Rule is not required because there is no statute of limitations on Trusts and
no statute of limitations to quiet title to real property; however, the discovery rule would be
applicable if needed based on arguments set forth herein.
Defendants argue that even if it is applicable, the statute of limitations expired. This claim
is totally without merit based on the purpose of the discovery rule where concealment and special
circumstances exist, as set forth herein. Both Plaintiffs believed there were no Trusts and that
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they had no inheritance, until such time as the Trusts were discovered by Plaintiffs' counsel in
2002
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs request this Court to vacate the Order Granting Defendants' Summary Judgment
and remand the case with instructions as set forth in Plaintiffs' Brief of Appellant previously filed
in the above-entitled matter
DATED this _JjJday

of December, 2004

NOtAtff OLSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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